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Abstract. One of the most interesting aspects of Conceptual Structures
Theory is the notion of canonicity. It is also one of the most neglected:
Sowa seems to have abandoned it in the new version of the theory, and
most of what has been written on canonicity focuses on the generalization
hierarchy of conceptual graphs induced by the canonical formation rules.
Although there is a common intuition that a graph is canonical if it is
\meaningful", the original theory is somewhat unclear about what that
actually means, in particular how canonicity is related to logic.
This paper argues that canonicity should be kept a rst-class notion
of Conceptual Structures Theory, provides a detailed analysis of work
done so far, and proposes new denitions of the conformity relation
and the canonical formation rules that allow a clear separation between
canonicity and truth.
Topics: Conceptual Graph Theory, Knowledge Representation, Ontolo-
gies
1 Introduction
The development of Conceptual Structures Theory (CST) has been driven to
great extent by natural language and its meaningfulness levels [8, p. 94]: gib-
berish; ungrammatical sequence; violation of selectional constraints; logically
inconsistent; possibly false; empirically true. Syntax distinguishes the rst two
levels from the other ones, canonicity handles level 3, and logic the rest. Thus
canonicity provides the ontological level that draws the borderline between mean-
ingless and meaningful expressions (which are graphs in CST).
One could argue that syntax and logic are enough because any conceptual
graph that obeys the arity of relations can be translated into a syntactically
well-formed rst-order formula and as such can be given a truth value. We feel
however that logic alone does not distinguish the dierent \degrees" of falsehood:
\Pigs y" and \Portugal is a monarchy" are both false statements but not in the
same way. Any knowledge representation theory should provide a way to capture
our intuitions about such statements. In this paper, that role will be played by
the ontology. Besides its conceptual importance, it has practical advantages: it
can be shared by many knowledge bases; the knowledge representation system
becomes more exible and robust regarding arbitrary user input; processing an
expression becomes more ecient.
Ideally, the ontology should be accompanied by two mechanisms: one to de-
rive all the meaningful expressions, and the other to check whether an expression
is meaningful. In CST the ontology is called canon, the derivation mechanism
is given by the canonical formation rules, the checking mechanism is projection,
and the meaningful expressions are the canonical graphs. A canon is specied
by its types, markers, conformity relation and canonical basis. The conformity
relation indicates for each marker all the types to which it is compatible, while
the canonical basis is the initial set of graphs to which the canonical formation
rules are applied.
In spite of its conceptual and practical importance, canonicity has been sel-
dom a central theme of investigation.Most of the time only two notions \derived"
from the canonical formation rules have received attention: projection and the
generalization hierarchy. Only seldom have the knowledge representation aspects
of canonicity been investigated: what are meaningful graphs? how is canonicity
related to logic? This paper analyzes the work known to us, which can be sum-
marized as follows. The original theory regards conformant concepts (i.e. those
that obey the conformity relation) as true ones, while the canonical formation
rules preserve falsehood: hence the relationship to logic is unclear since there
are both true canonical graphs and true non-canonical graphs (and the same for
false graphs). Kocura [5] considers that truth implies canonicity and therefore
all non-canonical graphs must be false. Wermelinger [13] and Sexton [7] consider
a graph to be canonical if it obeys the relation signatures given in the canonical
basis. Finally, Sowa's new version of the theory [9] has no notion of canonicity:
the denitions of conformity relation, canon, and canonical graphs have disap-
peared, and the canonical formation rules are just an auxiliary denition used
by the inference rules.
This paper presents a dierent perspective on canonicity which ts better into
the three meaningfulness levels (syntax, ontology, logic). A level characterizes a
set of graphs, each level being a superset of the next one: canonical graphs are
conceptual graphs (i.e., syntactically well-formed graphs), and true and false
graphs are canonical. Seeing it the other way round, it does not make sense to
speak about the canonicity of a non-conceptual graph or about the truth value
of a non-canonical graph. To adhere to this principle, the conformity relation
and the canonical formation rules (and thus the denition of projection) will be
changed.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section is dedicated to the
conformity relation. In the original theory, if marker m conforms to type t then
\m is a t", i.e. m belongs to t's denotation. As will be seen, this interpretation
of conformity has several problems. To allow false graphs to be canonical (and
therefore conformant), the conformity relation will be relaxed.
The third section deals with the canonical basis. The main issue is to dene
what kinds of graphs the knowledge engineer may put into the canonical basis in
order to specify useful selectional constraints. There have been several proposals,
ranging from simple relation signatures to an arbitrary collection of graphs. We
analyze those proposals and conclude that Sowa's original denition is still the
most satisfactory one.
Section 4 handles the canonical formation rules. The original ones [8] only
specialize the graphs they are applied to, but in [9] they may also generalize
them. We follow the same approach because due to our principle true graphs
(handled in [11]) should be canonical. Therefore the inference rules should be a
special case of the formation rules. However, the formal denition of the latter
will be changed to allow them to be applied directly instead of through the
inference rules (as in [9]).
The last section characterizes canonical graphs in the usual two ways: using
the canonical formation rules or projection. The denition of the latter will
be extended to cope with the new denition of the former. An algorithm that
decides whether a graph is canonical or not will be given. It is almost identical
to the one for the original theory [6] and has the same complexity.
We use the following notational conventions: t and t
0
are concept types, i
is an individual marker, m is an individual marker or the generic marker *,
 is the subtype relation, and t ^ t
0
denotes the maximal common subtype of
both types. All references to pages (p. X) and to the original theory (Assump-
tion/Theorem/Denition x:y:z) are to be understood in the context of [8]. The
denitions given in the paper will be rather informal, since the formal details
depend on the exact formalization of the basic notions (marker, type, concept,
relation, etc.). Due to lack of space we will only deal with CST in its simplest
form, assuming however that relation types may form a hierarchy [13]. The com-
plete formalization of canonicity [12] also deals with higher-order types, a marker
hierarchy including the absurd marker, contexts and coreference links.
2 The conformity relation
Sowa introduced the conformity relation :: as a test to be done when changing
a concept's type: \if #98077 is a cat then CAT :: #98077 is true; otherwise, it is
false"; in the second case \ ANIMAL: #98077 could not be restricted to CAT: #98077 "
(p. 87). The sentence quoted rst makes it very clear that an individual conforms
to a type if and only if it belongs to the set denoted by the type. This is further
stressed by the formal denition (Assumption 3.3.3) which imposes the following
conditions:
1. for any concept t: m , t :: m;
2. if t  t
0
and t :: i, then t
0
:: i;
3. if t :: i and t
0
:: i, then t ^ t
0
:: i;
4. for any i, > :: i, but not ? :: i;
5. for any t, t :: .
In fact, if we dene the conformity relation as the expression of the denotation
(formally, t :: m , m = * _ m 2 t) then we easily get condition 5 from the
denition, and conditions 2 and 4 from the properties of : > is the universal
set, ? is the empty set, and t  t
0
implies t  t
0
.
As noted in [2], an individual marker cannot conform to two incompatible
types (i.e., t ^ t
0
= ?). Otherwise conditions 3 and 4 would contradict each
other. But the problem roots deeper. In fact, condition 3 implies that (t^ t
0
) =
(t)\(t
0
) which is called the lattice-theoretic interpretation of the type hierarchy
in [1]. This contradicts the order-theoretic interpretation of Theorem 3.2.6: (t^
t
0
)  t \ t
0
. Also, the lattice-theoretic approach has conceptual and practical
drawbacks: a maximal common subtype must be interpreted as the \implication"
of its supertypes, and the intersection of each pair of compatible types must be
represented by an explicit type, leading to an explosion of conceptually irrelevant
types.
Example 1. Consider a knowledge base about people, containing types for jobs
and family relationships. According to the lattice-theoretic interpretation, UNCLE =
SON ^ BROTHER means that every person which is a son and a brother is also
an uncle, clearly an undesired meaning. If TEACHER :: #Michael and FATHER ::
#Michael then the type FATHER-TEACHERmust exist for condition 3 to be satis-
ed, even if there is no other teacher with children in the knowledge base.
Even if condition 3 is abandoned other problems remain. Condition 1 forces
every concept to be conformant. We will not impose this constraint as it is too
strong in our opinion. Furthermore, notice that ? :: * but not ? :: i. Logi-
cally, both are false statements since they correspond to 9x 2 ? and i 2 ?,
contradicting ? = ;. There is thus no valid reason to allow one but not the
other.
Furthermore, if the conformity relation is just the indication of the types each
individual marker is an instance of, then it is theoretically useless, because the
same eect can be obtained by axioms in the knowledge base: assert in the outer
context ? : * and t : i whenever t :: i . Applying the generalization inference
rule one gets t
0
: i for any t
0
 t (including t
0
= >) and t : * for any t. Also,
since the rst-order rules of inference are consistent, the graph ? : i can never
be obtained. Thus conditions 2, 4, and 5 are satised.
The real problem however is not of formal but of conceptual nature. If t :: i
means that \i is a t", then all false concepts will not be conformant and as
such cannot be generated by the canonical formation rules. As Sexton [7] noted,
this is not consistent with the statement \The formation rules enforce selectional
constraints, but they make no guarantee of truth or falsity" (p. 94). As a concrete
example, take the one on page 92: if BEAGLE :: #Snoopy then DOG: #Snoopy cannot
be restricted to COLLIE: #Snoopy since Snoopy is a beagle, not a collie. Sexton
remarks that the latter concept is a meaningful one and therefore should be
allowed in a canonical graph, although the individual marker does not belong to
the denotation of (i.e., conform to) the type.
Therefore, in this paper a new notion of conformity relation is proposed: a
marker m will conform to a type t if t : i should be part of a true or false graph.
Thus, conformity (as part of the broader notion of canonicity) does not imply
truth any longer. Conversely, it does not make sense to speak about the truth
or falsehood of a graph with non-conformant concepts.
Before presenting the formal denition, some observations are in order. First,
as ? : m is false for any m, it will be considered a conformant concept. Second,
if t : i is true, so is t
0
: i for any supertype t
0
; and if it is false, it is for any
subtype t
0
, too. To put it simply,
if t :: i then t
0
:: i for any t
0
 t or t
0
 t.
Formally, however, we cannot state it this way, because t :: i would imply > :: i
(and ? :: i) and therefore t
0
:: i for any type t
0
. In other words, any individ-
ual marker would conform to any type, thus making the conformity relation
meaningless. Even if we impose the restriction ? < t < > in the above rule, an
individual marker would still conform to concept types that are \zig-zag"-related
in the type hierarchy. To circumvent this, we split the conformity relation into
two relations: the base relation is given by the knowledge engineer and states for
each individual marker what are the most relevant types it should conform to;
the actual conformity relation is basically just the closure of the base relation
over subtypes and supertypes.
Assumption1. Given a relation R between concept types and markers, the
conformity relation :: is the smallest superset of R such that
{ for any m, > ::m and ? :: m;
{ for any t, t :: *;
{ for any t and m, if tRm and t  t
0
or t
0
 t, then t
0
:: m.
Relaxing the denition of conformity is not only theoretically more elegant,
it has also practical advantages: a conceptual graph processor can be made more
robust and it can indicate the source of errors precisely. Consider for exam-
ple a natural language processor that has to join the concepts MAN: #Lou and
WOMAN: #Lou . According to the original denition, the resulting concept ?: #Lou
does not obey the conformity relation and as such the join would fail (i.e. the
text would not be parsed). An implementation could provide some ad-hoc way
to indicate the source of error to the user, but it is always better to have a clean
theoretical framework, as is the case with the new denition: the concept is
meaningful, although false, and the absurd type clearly shows where the parsing
has produced an inconsistency.
3 The Canon
The conformity relation is only a small part of the overall denition of an on-
tology to be used by one or more knowledge bases. In Conceptual Structures
Theory the ontology is called canon and contains the types, the markers, the
conformity relation, and an initial set of well-formed graphs, the canonical basis
(Assumption 3.4.5). By applying the canonical formation rules to those graphs
one obtains all canonical graphs, i.e. all graphs that \are meaningful" (p. 91).
However, the Conceptual Catalog [8, Appendix B] assigns a canonical graph
to each concept or relation type in order to specify the selectional constraints
to be observed by each type. Besides not being part of the formal denition
of canonical basis, this association lead the Conceptual Structures community
to use the term \canonical graph" in two dierent senses: (1) a graph that is
derivable from the canonical basis, and (2) the graph in the canonical basis that
is associated to a given type. Of course, these two senses are not incompatible,
since (2) implies (1). To make the distinction clear, the elements of the canonical
basis will be called base graphs.
The existence or not of associations between types and base graphs inu-
ences greatly the notion of canonical graph, because in the former case the base
graph of type t must project on any graph using t. As Willems pointed out
1
,
this leads to another dual view of the canonical basis: whether it represents se-
lectional constraints on the links between relations and concepts, or mandatory
\arguments" of types.
Example 2 (adapted from Willems). Consider these graphs, the rst two being
base graphs:
1. ACT !




AGNT! ANIMATE
2. PERSON  




AGNT GIVE !




OBJ! OBJECT
#




RCPT ! PERSON
3. GIVE !




AGNT! PERSON: #John
If base graphs are not assigned to types, then graph 3 is canonical because it
can be derived from the rst one. But if graph 2 is associated to concept type
GIVE, then graph 3 is no longer canonical as it is missing two arguments of the
verb.
Contrary to what Willems seems to imply, the problem is not the existence
of associations per se, but the kind of associations done. As seen, assigning base
graphs to concept types rules out meaningful graphs, that we would like to
consider canonical, on the ground of having only partial information. This is not
acceptable for a knowledge representation formalism. Moreover, we feel that the
\arguments" view of the canonical basis is more appropriate of a lexicon [10].
It is however possible to retain the \selectional constraint" view as long as
associations are restricted to relation types and if base graphs consist only of
a single relation. Thus each base graph states the \signature" of the associated
relation type, i.e. its arity and the maximal concept types of its arguments. This
kind of base graph is called star graph and was introduced in [2]. Graph 1 of
Example 2 could be the star graph of AGNT. This approach has been adopted by
[13] and extended to handle relation type hierarchies: if t  t
0
then the star graph
of relation type t
0
must project into the star graph of t. Although not apparent
at rst sight, Sexton [7, Section VIII] also advocates the use of star graphs: \In
order for a graph to be canonical, the type of each arc of each conceptual relation
must be predicable [i.e., a supertype] of the type of the concept the arc points
to". In other words, each relation must state the maximal type of each of its
1
In a message sent to the CG mailing list on July 31, 1992.
arcs (i.e., arguments). To sum up, both [13, 7] consider a graph to be canonical
if and only if all relations are used according to their signatures.
This is obviously a very weak notion of canonicity because the set of canon-
ical graphs is too large. Star graphs are also too restrictive: by imposing the
form and the number of base graphs (one for each relation type), the user can
only specify very simple selectional constraints that take no contextual informa-
tion into account. However, star graphs have computational advantages. As the
recognition of a canonical graph is based on graph projection (see Section 5), if
the elements of the canonical basis have a single relational vertex the complexity
becomes polynomial.
The approach of Chein and Mugnier [2, 6] is better. They distinguish between
the canonical basis and the basis of the support . The latter is the set of star
graphs, and the graphs generated by the canonical formation rules from the star
graphs are called well-formed . As in the original theory, the authors consider the
canonical basis to be the generator set of the canonical graphs, but as expected
they require the graphs of the canonical basis to be well-formed. This means
that every canonical graph is well-formed. Therefore in this approach there is
a new meaningfulness level between arbitrary conceptual graphs and canonical
graphs. Notice that in the approaches mentioned above [13, 7] the canonical
basis corresponds to the basis of the support and hence there is no distinction
between well-formed and canonical graphs.
Chein and Mugnier's \mixed" approach is not as restrictive, but still there
are conditions imposed on the elements of the canonical basis. This limits the
knowledge engineer's exibility to specify an ontology. Moreover, if the type of
an argument of a relation depends on the type of another of its arguments, more
than one star graph is necessary for that relation type. Also, it seems to us
that the selectional constraints specied by star graphs are just a special case
of the selectional constraints that base graphs are supposed to express. In fact,
it is easy to provide a tool that checks whether the relations occurring in the
canonical basis are used consistently.
To sum up, Sowa's original denition of a canonical basis as a set of con-
ceptual graphs is still the most satisfactory one, as it provides all the exibility
required by a knowledge engineer, who is free to adhere to the specication disci-
pline imposed by star graphs if he wishes. The formal denition of canon remains
hence similar to Sowa's, but as expected it uses the new denition of conformity
relation, which must be obeyed by every base graph. This is not explicitly stated
in the original Assumption 3.4.5 since condition 1 of the original denition of
conformity relation already required every concept to be conformant. As we have
abandoned condition 1 in general, we must impose it for the base graphs.
Notice that the canonical basis may be redundant: it might be possible to
derive exactly the same canonical graphs just from a proper subset of the canon-
ical basis. A Conceptual Structures system can detect that case using Theorem 7
(Section 5) to verify for each base graph if it can be derived from the other ones.
4 The canonical formation rules
The rules proposed by Assumption 3.4.3 have several advantages: they are sim-
ple, they do not contain redundancies (i.e. they are independent from each other),
and they are specialization rules. This means that their application (called a
canonical derivation) establishes a relationship between the initial graphs and
the resulting one that can be analyzed both from the logical (implication) as
from the graph-theoretical viewpoint (projection).
The drawback of using just specialization rules is that not every true graph
is a canonical one, clearly an undesirable state of aairs. Considering Example 2
again, if graph 3 is true and ACT  EVENT then EVENT !




AGNT! PERSON: #John
is also true but as it cannot be obtained by specialization from the other three
graphs, it is not a canonical graph. This is contrary to the idea that canonical
graphs are \meaningful graphs that represent real or possible situations in the
external world" (p. 91). In other words, the true graphs must be a subset of the
canonical graphs. Hence, given a set of true graphs, the graphs derived from them
using the inference rules must be canonical and as such should be obtained by
applying the canonical formation rules to the same set of graphs. Put dierently,
the inference rules must be a particular case of the canonical formation rules.
This is the approach followed in the new version of the theory [9]. Sowa has
made the canonical formation rules more general, and the inference rules limit
the applicability of the formation rules. He made two kinds of changes. First,
some rules do not apply to a single vertex or to a complete graph any more but
to a subgraph. Second, rules have been divided into three groups: those that
generate a logically equivalent graph, those that specialize the graph to which
they are applied, and those that generalize it.
As the next example shows, the rules are no longer independent from each
other. It is possible to get the same result from the same graph(s) applying
dierent rules (to dierent subgraphs in some cases). Although [9] does not
state what a subgraph is, from the rules we interpret it in the graph-theoretical
way as a subset of vertices and edges. A subgraph therefore does not have to
be a conceptual graph. In particular it may be just a single relation node. This
allows the new rules to include the original simplication rule.
Example 3. From the graph ACT !




AGNT! ANIMATE one can derive
ACT !




AGNT! ANIMATE
& %




AGNT
in two distinct ways. The rst is to make a copy of the subgraph




AGNT , which
shows that the two graphs are equivalent. The second one starts with a copy of
the whole graph and then joins pairwise equal concepts.
The notion of canonicity does not exist in [9]. As such, the canonical for-
mation rules are not used autonomously but by the inference rules. There are
however good reasons to want to use the canonical formation rules directly:
{ in many applications (like natural language understanding [10]) it is useful
to process graphs whose truth value is unknown;
{ it is desirable to have an \operational" characterization of canonical graphs;
{ the canonical formation rules can be a starting point for the denition of
other operations.
Since the new canonical formation rules may specialize part of a graph and
generalize some other part, the notion of projection must be relaxed to allow the
\declarative" characterization of the canonical graphs thus obtained.
Denition2. Let g and g
0
be two conceptual graphs. A semi-projection  : g !
g
0
is a function that maps g to a subgraph of g
0
such that
{ for any vertex v of g, either (v)  v or (v)  v
2
;
{ for any relation r of g, if its i-th arc a links r to concept c, then (a) is the
i-th arc between (r) and (c).
If the function is a bijection then g
0
is called an semi-instance of g.
The new canonical formation rules can now be presented. They are similar
to Sowa's. The changes made arose from the need to generate only ontologically
meaningful graphs. Therefore some rules had to be restricted. Others had to be
added to make sure that the rst-order rules of inference are indeed a particular
case of the canonical formation rules
3
.
Assumption3. Given a canon and zero or more conceptual graphs, the canon-
ical formation rules generate new graphs. Some rules are dened in terms of
subgraph duplication, removal and substitution. The denition of subgraph de-
pends on the rule to be applied. In any case the operations also duplicate, re-
move, or substitute the arcs between subgraph vertices and external vertices. If
the graphs to which the rules are applied obey the conformity relation then so
must the resulting graph. In the following c is a context, either empty or con-
taining the conceptual graphs g
1
and g
2
which might be the same one. Graphs
g
0
1
and g
0
2
are subgraphs of g
1
and g
2
, respectively.
{ Equivalence Rules. In these rules, if a subgraph contains a concept, it also
contains all relations linked to the concept.
Copy Make a copy of g
0
1
.
Simplify Remove g
0
1
if g
0
1
and g
0
2
are identical and are linked to the same
external vertices but have no vertices in common.
{ Specialization Rules. In these rules, if a subgraph contains a relation, it also
contains all concepts linked to the relation.
Join Overlay g
0
1
and g
0
2
if they are identical.
2
This is an extension of the partial order over types to concepts and relations.
3
That does not happen in [9] and neither in this paper since we restrict ourselves
to graphs without contexts or coreference links. The full version of the canonical
formation rules [12] is however a generalization of the inference rules [11].
Restrict Substitute a vertex v of g
1
by a specialization if v has not been
unrestricted before.
Insertion Insert a base graph in c.
{ Generalization Rules. In these rules, if a subgraph contains a relation, it also
contains all concepts linked to the relation.
Detach Substitute g
1
by g
0
1
if g
0
1
is a semi-instance of some base graph.
Unrestrict Substitute a vertex v of g
1
by a generalization if v has not been
restricted previously.
Remove Remove g
1
.
The detailed explanation of the rules is given in [12]. The next subsections
will just highlight the most important issues. First some general remarks. As in
Sowa's original rules, the conformity relation must be checked before restricting
or relaxing a concept. The formulation is also much more concise and simpler
than those in [9, 4]. It is also clearer as it gives precise denitions of subgraphs.
As Sowa's new rules, these are not independent from each other but they are so
within each of the three groups.
4.1 Copy and Simplify
To see the reason for the given denition of subgraph, consider a concept c
linked to a relation r such that c is part of the subgraph but r is not. Then the
copy or simplication (i.e., removal) of c adds or removes the arc to r. In other
words, the arity of r increments or decrements by one, and the resulting graph
is not canonical. Therefore r must also be part of the subgraph as required by
Assumption 3. Now, if r is duplicated or removed, its links to some external
concept c
0
will be duplicated or removed, too, but that only changes the number
of arcs attached to c
0
, not the arity of r or its copy r
0
(see Example 3).
As for the simplify rule, two subgraphs g
0
1
and g
0
2
are duplicates only if they
are connected to the same external vertices. There are two cases. If there are no
such vertices then g
0
1
= g
1
and g
0
2
= g
2
, which means that we are considering two
copies of a complete graph. Hence one of them can be eliminated. In the second
case, if the external vertices are the same, the two subgraphs must be part of the
same graph: g
1
= g
2
. In both cases the two subgraphs may not overlap. As for
the rst case that would amount to g
1
= g
2
and the simplify rule would become
the remove rule. The problem in the second case is similar.
Example 4. Consider the relation NTT (not taller than) between persons. The
subgraph




NTT ! PERSON: #John !




NTT occurs twice in
PERSON: #John !




NTT ! PERSON: #John
- .




NTT
Eliminating one of the copies one gets just PERSON: #John which is not equivalent
to the original.
Notice that the simplify rule stated in [9] does not impose any restriction on
the duplicate subgraphs. As such, it is not an equivalence rule.
4.2 Restrict and Unrestrict
The restrict and unrestrict rules now allow to generalize or specialize any vertex
(including relations), but they prevent the generalization and specialization of
the same vertex. If that would be possible, any type t could be substituted by any
other type t
0
, even an incompatible one. This has been noted independently by
[12, 5]. It means that the canonical formation rules could derive almost any non-
canonical graph from the canonical basis, thus making the selectional constraints
imposed by the base graphs useless.
Example 5. ACT !




AGNT! ANIMATE can be restricted to ACT !




AGNT! ?
and then unrestricted to ACT !




AGNT! IDEA . The intermediate step could
also be a generalization to ACT !




AGNT! > followed by a specialization to
the nal graph.
In Sowa's approach, the canonical formation rules are only used by the infer-
ence rules. Since a graph cannot be simultaneously in an even context (where it
can be generalized) and in an odd one (where it could be specialized), the restrict
and unrestrict rules are never mixed. In our approach there were two possibili-
ties: generalizations and specializations are forbidden for the same graph or just
for the same vertex. The second option is more exible and has been adopted.
The interplay between specialization and generalization is subtle. Certain
vertices cannot be changed at all, namely those that were obtained by joining a
vertex that has been generalized with one that was specialized.
Example 6. Let PERSON < ANIMAL < ANIMATE and let NTT be the relation of Ex-
ample 4. From the conceptual graphs
ACT !




AGNT! ANIMATE PERSON !




NTT ! PERSON
it is possible to obtain ACT !




AGNT! ANIMAL!




NTT ! PERSON by re-
stricting ANIMATE and unrestricting PERSON followed by a join on both.
The ANIMAL concept can be no longer changed. Otherwise it would be pos-
sible to obtain e.g. ACT !




AGNT! DOG !




NTT ! PERSON through special-
ization and ACT !




AGNT! PHYSOBJ !




NTT ! PERSON through generaliza-
tion, which violate NTT's and AGNT's selectional constraints, respectively.
To correctly implement these rules it is necessary to keep the history of each
vertex. That can be done using two boolean variables, one indicating if the vertex
has been generalized, the other whether it was specialized. An operation can be
performed only if the variable corresponding to the other operation is set to
false. When two vertices are joined, the variables of the resulting vertex are the
conjunction of the corresponding variables of the original vertices.
4.3 Join and Detach
Both of Sowa's join rules [8, 9] only handle two (identical) concepts at a time.
The rule of Assumption 3 allows one to join identical subgraphs. Notice that the
rule allows them to belong to dierent graphs. That case is called an external join
in [6]. As the join of two relations also involves the join of their arguments, the
denition of subgraph is exactly the opposite of the one used by the equivalence
rules.
One should also point out that the simplication can be simulated by an
internal join, i.e. when the two subgraphs belong to the same graph. Indeed,
overlaying two subgraphs is equivalent to eliminating one of them while keeping
its arcs to the rest of the graph. As in the simplify rule both subgraphs have the
same external links, the overlapping eect is obtained. Let us see an example
using the graph of Example 4.
Example 7. Subgraph PERSON: #John !




NTT ! PERSON: #John occurs twice in
PERSON: #John !




NTT ! PERSON: #John
- .




NTT
Overlaying the two of them one gets PERSON: #John !




NTT ! PERSON: #John .
The same result can be obtained by applying the simplify rule to the




NTT
subgraph.
Sowa's detach rule allows one to erase any subgraph. It is obvious that the
remaining subgraph may not be canonical. Up to this part of the work, the only
graphs that are guaranteed to be canonical are the base graphs. Therefore our
rule must check that the remaining subgraph must be a base graph up to some
generalizations or specializations. By repeated application of the copy and the
detach rules it is possible to separate a graph into a cover of base components
(compare with Theorem 7).
5 Canonical Graphs
Now that we have a generator set (the canonical basis) and the generation rules
(the canonical formation rules) we can nally dene the notion of canonical
graph, which will be equivalent to the one of Assumption 3.4.5. Only the formu-
lation diers. The original canonical formation rules (Assumption 3.4.3) use just
the conformity relation and therefore the initial set of graphs to which the rules
are applied must be explicitly stated. In our formulation that set (the canonical
basis) is already part of the denition of the formation rules. Thus a canonical
graph is a graph that can be generated from a canon and an \empty sheet".
Denition4. A conceptual graph is called canonical regarding a given canon
C if it is possible to derive it from the empty set of graphs through application
of canonical formation rules using C.
In particular, applying the insertion rule one gets, as expected,
Proposition5. A base graph is canonical (regarding the canon it belongs to).
Although the denition of canonical graph is the same as the original one, due
to the dierences in the denitions of the conformity relation and the canonical
formation rules, given the same canonical basis both frameworks generate quite
dierent sets of canonical graphs. The sets are incomparable (i.e. neither is a
subset of the other) because Sowa's rules are not a subset of ours or vice-versa.
However, the presented rules guarantee as wished that every true or false graph
is canonical. Notice also that a graph can be considered canonical regarding a
canon, and non-canonical regarding another one.
Besides forming new canonical graphs it is also convenient to be able to
recognize them without explicitly constructing the derivation (the sequence of
rules) that leads to their formation. The original canonical formation rules just
specialize a graph. Hence the derivation process corresponds to a projection
(Theorem 3.5.4). In addition, Mugnier and Chein [6] have shown that if there
is a projection between two canonical graphs then there is a derivation. From
this and other results they obtained the following characterization: a conceptual
graph g is canonical if and only if there are projections of base graphs into g that
cover the whole of g. As the new canonical formation rules also allow vertices
to be generalized, projection is substituted by semi-projection (Denition 2) but
the main idea remains.
Denition6. A cover of a conceptual graph g is a nite set of conceptual graphs
fg
1
; : : : ; g
n
g such that each g
i
is a subgraph of g and each vertex and arc of g
occurs in at least one graph of the cover.
Theorem7. A conceptual graph is canonical regarding canon C if and only if
it obeys the conformity relation and has a cover G such that each graph g 2 G
is an semi-instance of a base graph of C.
The importance of the theorem (proven in [12]) stems from the fact that it
provides an algorithm to check whether a conceptual graph g (e.g. given by an
user) is canonical or not. The method consists basically in nding base graphs
whose semi-projections into g cover g completely. Since the semi-projection of a
relation also includes the concepts it is linked to, the algorithm can be simply as
follows. Choose a relation r of g and go through the canonical basis until nding
a base graph whose semi-projection into g contains r. All relations covered by
that semi-projection are marked and the process is repeated with an unmarked
relation. This algorithm is identical to the one presented in [6] except that the
projection is substituted by the semi-projection. Hence the algorithm still is
polynomial in relationship to the complexity of the base operation (in this case
semi-projection). Most of the time base graphs are trees. Therefore, in those
cases semi-projection has polynomial complexity and recognizing a canonical
graph takes polynomial time in the size of the graph and of the canonical basis.
6 Conclusions
This paper has argued that canonicity is fundamental to Conceptual Structures
Theory since it corresponds to the intermediate ontological level between syntax
and logic. Therefore it has both conceptual as practical advantages. We have
analyzed some of the literature on canonicity and found out that the (implicit)
meaning of canonicity is either too weak (as in the case of relation signatures) or
its relationship to logic is vague or dubious. We have therefore explicitly adopted
a very precise guideline: a graph should be canonical if we would like to make a
denite statement about its truth or falsehood. Therefore canonical graphs are
a superset of true and false graphs: it is meaningless to speak about the truth
value of a non-canonical graph and, for a given knowledge base, the truth value
of some canonical graphs may be unknown.
Based on this new perspective of canonicity, which provides a simple yet clear
relationship between the ontological and logical levels, we have substantially
changed the denitions of the conformity relation and the canonical formation
rules and improved their formulation. To stress the relation between canonical
and true graphs, the rst-order rules of inference have become a special case of
the canonical formation rules. Furthermore, the latter can now be used indepen-
dently of the former without the risk of generating non-canonical graphs.
In order to keep a \declarative" denition of canonical graphs projection
was generalized to semi-projection, but without computational impact since the
recognition of canonical graphs still has the same complexity as for the original
theory, in many cases being polynomial.
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